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Abstract. Th is brief note considers Peirce’s strategy of terminating potentially evil 
infi nities – concerning relations, continuous predicates, leading principles, habits – by 
appeal to the Nota Notae principle.
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Hegel famously coined the term “schlechte Unendlichkeit” to address the issue of a 
proliferating process of repetitive thought without end – which should be avoided.1 
A similar argument is oft en marshalled in philosophy in order to rule out excessive 
conceptuality. Regarding the reality of relations, thus, it can be counterargued that if 
you accept real relations, then what about the relations between the relation and its 
relata? And what about the relations between those second-order relations and the fi rst-
order relation – that calls for third-order relations and so on ad infi nitum, ultimately 
constituting a potential infi nity. But as reality is taken not to contain infi nities, such 
processes are supposed to have no reality counterparts. In the case of relations then, 
better avoid an evil infi nity by refusing to ascribe reality to any relations at all.
1 “Etwas wird ein Anderes, aber das andere ist selbst ein Etwas, also wird es gleichfalls ein 
Anderes, und so fort bis ins Unendliche.
Diese Unendlichkeit ist die schlechte oder negative Unendlichkeit, indem sie nichts ist, 
als die Negation des Endlichen, welches aber ebenso wieder entsteht, somit ebensosehr nicht 
aufgehoben ist – oder diese Unendlichkeit drückt nur das Sollen des Aufhebens des Endlichen 
aus. Der Progreß ins unendliche bleibt bei dem Aussprechen des Widerspruchs stehen, den das 
Endliche enthält, daß es sowohl Etwas ist als sein Anderes, und ist das perennierende Fortsetzen 
des Wechsels dieser einander herbeiführenden Bestimmungen.” (Hegel 1830, Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, §93–§94). Retrieved from http://www.zeno.org/
Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Enzyklopädie+der+philosophischen+Wis
senschaften+im+Grundrisse.
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In Peirce’s philosophy and semiotics – accepting the reality of relations – a recurring 
strategy appears to rule out such idling processes by reaching instead a rock bottom. 
Th at strategy, however, is not the Hegelian trick of Aufh ebung. What does it consist in? 
Let us take a few examples to give an idea. In his mature, deep-digging investigation 
of the structure of propositions (“Dicisigns”) taking its departure from the 1903 
Syllabus,2 one strategy is that of emptying a proposition for semantic content in order 
to reach its bare fundamental structure. Such emptying may be undertaken by means 
of hypostatically abstracting its predicates in order to constitute additional subjects.3 
Th us “Cain killed Abel” may be translated into “Cain stands in the relation of Killing to 
Abel”. Instead of the two-place predicate “X kills Y”, a three-place predicate “X stands 
in the relation of Z to Y” plus a new hypostatic subject Z, ‘Killing’, undertake the same 
task of description. In principle, such transcription is indefi nite - the next step would 
be to translate the three-place predicate into a four-place predicate: “X stands in the 
relation Z of standing in the relation Q to Y”. It is easy to see that this procedure may 
be continued into a schlechte Unendlichkeit. Instead, Peirce’s argument goes that there 
is absoluteluy no diff erence between standing in a relation to something and standing 
in the relation of standing in a relation to something (Stjernfelt 2014: 88–89). So here, 
already the fi rst step reached rock bottom, and “X stands in the relation of Z to Y” 
must be accepted as a primitive, not accessible to further such analysis. 
Another case is that of the leading principle of inferences. As a fundamental 
claim of the philosophy of logic, inferences are deemed valid reasonings only if they 
follow and acknowledge a general leading principle securing that not only in the 
particular case, but in a generic class of cases like premises lead to like conclusions. 
Th at leading principle is not counted among the premises of the inference but is rather 
the generic diagrammatic structure which makes evident that those premises do lead 
to the conclusion. A leading principle may be made explicit as a logical doctrine (e.g. 
Modus Ponens), but in most ordinary cases, the leading principle is accepted tacitly, 
yet subject to virtual self-control (here, Peirce is walking on a knife’s edge). Would it 
be better if all reasoners were taught logical doctrine, becoming able to make explicit 
their leading principles? Not necessarily, saw Peirce,4 because the very act of making 
explicit the leading principle will itself depend upon a leading principle (already e.g. 
“Algebra of logic”, 1880, 3.166). Th is fact, however, does not make logic obsolete because 
of dependence upon an infi nite abyss of still deeper leading principles. Rather, the 
leading principle of a leading principle is but that leading principle itself. 
2 Th e Syllabus was never published in its entirety, but various selections can be found in CP 
(Vols. 1, 2), as well as EP, Chs. 18–23.
3 In a letter to Lady Welby, 14 December 1908 (Peirce 1966: 396–397).
4 As argued by Pietarinen and Bellucci in a recent paper (in press).
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A further version of this rock-bottom principle pertains to the famous “unlimited 
semiosis”, so beloved by Derrida and deconstructivists: the principle that the 
interpretant of a sign is, in itself, a sign of the very same object. Th is basic defi nition 
makes the sign relation recursive and makes possible indefi nite chains of signs. 
Such a chain, however, is not autonomized and isolated from reality. Quite on the 
contrary, as the defi nition maintains, a single such chain pertains to the same object 
and potentially enriches the description of that object, ultimately to converge in a 
fi nal interpretant of that object (that is, if the sign using community sticks to basic, 
overarching principles of sign development).5 But, given the sign defi nition, how could 
there be a fi nal interpretant not itself a sign? Here, Peirce’s pragmatism famously holds 
that the fi nal meaning of a sign consists in the set of action habits which a rational 
person would adopt given that the conceived sum of eff ects of the sign is true.6 And 
that set of action habits are not themselves a sign (even if signs of it may, of course, be 
made). Again, the habit of a habit is that habit itself. 
All of these check blocks are particular versions of a general scholastic principle 
discussed by Peirce, the so-called Nota Notae principle, referring to the claim that “Nota 
notae est nota rei ipsius”: the predicate of a predicate is a predicate of the thing itself.7 
Originating in Aristotle’s Categories, the principle was later taken up by Wolff , Kant, 
and Stuart Mill. Th e Latin version just given Peirce fi nds in Kant. Of course, here the 
notion ‘predicate’ should be taken as referring to the meaning of the predicate, not 
the predicate word or expression itself. If it is taken to refer to the token or type of the 
predicate expression, the Nota Notae principle would be wrong (the fact that a predicate 
token is written in red ink does not imply that the object referred to is written in red ink; 
the fact that a predicate type stems from the 16th century does not imply that the object 
it refers to stems from that century, etc.). But if a certain colour is very rare, it does follow 
that objects having that colour are very rare. Or, Peirce’s standard example, if humans 
are mortal, and Enoch is human, it follows that Enoch is mortal. Here, the Nota Notae 
gives rise to a syllogism: ‘mortal’ is a second-order predicate of the fi rst-order-predicate 
‘human’, also holding for those which the fi rst-order predicate holds for. Th e particular 
5 Cf. Stjernfelt 2014, Ch. 11.
6 Regarding these aspects of Peirce’s concept of habit, see Pietarinen and Bellucci (in press) 
and Stjernfelt (in press).
7 In 1901, Peirce writes in a small article on the Nota Notae in Baldwin’s Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology: “Th e logical principle Nota notae est nota rei ipsius, that is, the 
predicate of the predicate is the predicate of the subject, which is laid down in several places by 
Aristotle as the general principle of syllogism. Th e principal passages are as follows: ‘When one 
thing is predicated of another as its subject, whatever is said of the predicate can also be said of 
the subject’ (Categ., iii. 1 b 10). ‘Whatever is said of the predicate will hold also of the subject’ 
(Categ., v. 3 b 4).” (“Nota Notae”, 1901, 2.590) 
 Othertimes, Peirce simply identifi es the Nota Notae with the transitivity of the copula: 
A=B, B=C → A=C.
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use of the principle in Peirce addressed here, however, highlights special cases where the 
fi rst- and second-order predicates of the Nota Notae are the same. Oft entimes, such cases 
will be meaningless (the red colour of the red colour, etc.): many predicates do not apply 
to themselves. Other predicates unproblematically apply to themselves (an utterance of 
an utterance, leading to any level of quotations of quotations; a sign of a sign, leading 
to any level of description of the sign’s object). Th e issue of which predicates are thus 
self-applicable is not a formal one, decidable from formal criteria, but rather pertains 
to the regional ontology to which that predicate belongs. Here, Peirce’s use of the Nota 
Notae focuses on a subset of those special cases where (1) the predicate is self-applicable 
and (2) its self-application does not change its meaning at all. While the utterance of an 
utterance is a special utterance, namely a quotation, the habit of a habit is simply that 
same habit. Th e former still conforms to the Nota Notae principle (because being quoted 
is also a property of the fi rst utterance), but the latter belongs to that special subset of 
self-applicable predicates where f2(x) = f(x), so to speak. All of those are continuous in 
the special sense Peirce used when picking the term ‘continous predicates’: applying the 
predicate to itself gives but the same predicate, just like joining one continuous line to 
another gives a continuum of the same power.
Th ey form a rock bottom providing Peirce’s seemingly byzantine logic and 
semiotics with a fundamental inventory of formal ontology: relations, continuous 
predicates, leading principles, habits are not further analysable and must be taken 
to belong to the basic furniture of ontology. If we accept Peirce’s argument, the next 
question follows: how much belongs to such furniture?
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Блокировка «дурных бесконечностей»: 
заметка об одной заметке о стратегии Пирса
В этой короткой заметке рассматривается пирсовская стратегия блокировки потен-
циально „дурных бесконечностей“ (касающихся отношений, непрерывных предикатов, 
ведущих принципов, привычек (habits)) с помощью принципа nota notae.
Halbade lõpmatuste blokeerimine: märkus üht Peirce’i strateegiat 
puudutava märkuse kohta
See lühimärkus puudutab Peirce’i strateegiat potentsiaalselt “halbadele lõpmatustele” – mis 
puudutavad suhteid, kestvaid predikaate, juhtpõhimõtteid, tavasid – lõpu tegemiseks nota 
notae põhimõtet appi võttes. 
